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The Syrian conflict, a civil war with sectarian patterns driven by endogenous and 
exogenous dynamics, has turned into a proxy war catalysing the major geopolitical 
tensions of today’s contested world order. The conflict represents a major challenge 
for the Euro-Atlantic community as it reflects Russia’s reassertion as a counter-power 
to the United States (US) and the European Union (EU) in the Middle East. Taking a 
structural realist approach, the Syrian conflict can be interpreted as a confrontation 
for regional hegemony. This paper explores the implications of Russia’s reassertion for 
the Euro-Atlantic community’s approaches to Syria and the Middle East as well as for 
transatlantic relations. It argues that in the power vacuum created by the Arab Spring, 
Russia’s engagement in Syria has highlighted the limits of American and European 
approaches to the region. Moreover, Russia’s reassertion as a regional hegemon 
challenges the Euro-Atlantic cohesion and is likely to lead to a ‘forced emancipation’ 
of the EU from the US as a strategic foreign policy actor.  
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Introduction: ‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend’ 
Stimulated by both endogenous and exogenous dynamics, the Syrian conflict has 
rapidly become not only a humanitarian disaster but also “one of the most complex 
ideological, socio-political and economic situations today”.1 Strengthened through 
an intertwining of regional and international alliances, it turned into a proxy war 
between great powers, an entanglement that has hampered the conflict resolution 
process launched in late 2015 by Washington and Moscow. The Syrian conflict echoes 
a sense of Cold War resurgence between Russia and the Euro-Atlantic community, 
comprising the United States (US), the European Union (EU) and its member states. The 
relations of the Euro-Atlantic community embody a “powerful constellation of interests, 
norms and identities, alongside a deeply intertwined history, inform[ing] a shared vision 
of the West as bearing special responsibility for maintaining global peace, stability and 
prosperity”.2 
 In March 2011, when the uprising was still a non-violent revolutionary process, 
the Assad regime triggered a shift to violence through “a combination of repressive 
measures and counter-mobilization” which led to a civil war.3 Considering the very 
nature of the Syrian society and political regime, Balanche argues that the 
communitarian and religious dimensions of the conflict has since the beginning been 
emphasised by the fact that protests took place among the Sunni communities – the 
predominant majority of the population – and against a regime dominated by 
Alawites and other religious minorities.4 In the Middle East, such a ‘confessionalisation’ 
of the conflict was echoed at the regional level, leading to “a regionalized civil war”5 
with a complex internationalisation. Hence, schematically, the Syrian conflict has to 
be analysed through the lens of a three-level intertwining: at the domestic, regional 
and extra-regional levels. 
                                                 
1 Khashanah, Khaldoun, “The Syrian Crisis: A Systemic Framework”, Contemporary Arab Affairs, 
vol. 7, no. 1, 2014, p. 18. 
2 Tocci, Nathalie & Riccardo Alcaro, “Rethinking transatlantic relations in a multipolar era”, 
International Politics, vol. 51, no. 3, pp. 366-367. 
3 Dostal, Jörg Michael, “Analyzing the domestic and international conflict in Syria: Are there 
lessons from political science?”, Syria Studies, vol. 6, no. 1, 2014, pp. 47-48. 
4 Balanche, Fabrice, « Syrie : Guerre civile et internationalisation du conflit », EurOrient, no. 41, 
2013, p. 14. 
5 Tabler, Andrew, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, quoted in Gilsinan, Kathy, “The 





On the ground, the Assad regime is confronted by politically disparate rebel 
forces. The Kurds, scattered over four neighbouring countries, fight for the creation of 
a state of their own: Kurdistan. The so-called ‘Islamic State of Iraq and Sham’ (ISIS or 
Daesh), a fundamentalist Salafi terrorist group, has expanded its territorial basis over 
the Syrian-Iraqi border in order to establish a Caliphate, which has, however, been 
considerably reduced again over the past two years.  
These lines of division are transposed at the regional level. On the one side, the 
Assad regime counts on the support of the Shia axis composed of Bagdad (dominated 
by the Shias since the American invasion), the Hezbollah and Tehran. On the other 
side, the rebels are mainly sponsored – that is, armed and funded – by the Sunni axis 
dominated by Saudi Arabia and Qatar which, together with Turkey, are antagonistic 
to Assad and the Shia axis with the objective of weakening Tehran.6 As for the Kurds of 
Syria, they find their main support in Kurdish groups from Turkey and Iraq.  
Both domestic parties and their regional partners have grown more and more 
dependent on extra-regional sponsors. Russia’s support of Assad since the outbreak of 
the crisis is its first military engagement outside the post-Soviet space since the end of 
the Cold War. Russia seeks to help Assad to stay in power and regain territories taken 
by the rebels, in order to avoid regime change and prevent the Russian ISIS foreign 
fighters from coming back to their native country. This helps explain why Moscow 
draws ‘no line’ between the rebels and ISIS. Moreover, in a region under US influence, 
Damascus is of strategic importance for Russia, not only in the framework of the 
‘partnership of reason’ built with Tehran, but most importantly for political influence 
and military projection, primarily through the Tartus naval base. 7 When it comes to the 
Syrian opposition, American and European sponsorship is, however, not as important. 
Despite the aim of facilitating a political transition and annihilate ISIS, the transatlantic 
community has not managed to reach a consensus on a military intervention in Syria, 
apart from bombing ISIS. Additionally, the West’s support of the Kurds puts the 
international coalition against ISIS at risk for two reasons: first, because it includes 
Turkey, which fears the creation of an independent Kurdistan and thus also bombs the 
                                                 
6 See Asseburg, Muriel & Heiko Wimmen, “Civil War in Syria. External Actors and Interests as 
Drivers of Conflict”, SWP Comments, no. 43, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute 
for International and Security Affairs, Berlin, December 2012, p. 3. 
7 Facon, Isabelle, quoted in Didier, Brice, « ‘Faire Grand avec peu’ : la crise syrienne, catalyseur 
du retour de la Russie sur la scène internationale », Institut Open Diplomacy, Paris, 16 May 2016, 
retrieved 19 April 2017, http://www.open-diplomacy.eu/blog/faire-grand-avec-peu-la-crise-
syrienne-catalyseur-du-reto 
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Kurds; second, because the Kurds can draw benefits from a Russian intervention which 
limits the expansion of the Syrian rebels under Turkish protection.  
Although the Syrian conflict has become “the largest battlefield and generator 
of Sunni-Shia sectarianism the world has ever seen, with deep implications for the 
future boundaries of the Middle East and the spread of terrorism”,8 what is first and 
foremost at stake is the new regional and international power showdown that this 
conflict brings to light. Russian Prime Minister Medvedev even concluded that “we 
have slid into a time of a new Cold War”.9 A characteristic phenomenon of the Cold 
War period, proxy wars are not a new trend, but have become even more relevant in 
contemporary conflicts, particularly in the Middle East.10 As argued by Asseburg and 
Wimmen, “[e]xternal supporters of both sides treat the conflict as a zero-sum game 
with far-reaching and, for some actors existential, consequences for their own 
strategic positions”.11 Hence, Russia’s intervention in Syria has to be analysed not as a 
simple strategic digression but as a long-term challenge for the Euro-Atlantic 
community. Having lost its global power status with the fall of the Soviet Union, the 
Syrian crisis presented an opportunity for Russia to recover its past standing in 
international affairs. The Kremlin has challenged Western exit initiatives from the Syrian 
conflict, revealing “deep flaws in post-Cold War Western doctrine on international 
intervention”, particularly in the Middle East, a strategic area of influence for the US.12 
Admittedly, Russia’s engagement in Syria can be analysed in the context of the 
fight against terrorism and the ‘security continuum’ existing between its domestic 
territory and the Middle East, or as a reaction to what Moscow views as Western-
influenced regime changes in Iraq and Libya.13 However, Syria has been “a centre of 
                                                 
8 Tabler, op. cit.  
9 Medvedev, Dmitri, Intervention at the 52nd Munich Security Conference, quoted in Meyer, 
Henry, Ian Wishart & Andrey Biryukov, “Russia’s Medvedev: We Are in ‘a New Cold War’”, 
Bloomberg, 13 February 2016, retrieved 27 March 2017, https://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/articles/2016-02-13/russia-sees-new-cold-war-as-nato-chief-criticizes-nuclear-threat  
10 Brown, Seyom, “Purposes and Pitfalls of War by Proxy: A Systemic Analysis”, Small Wars & 
Insurgencies, vol. 27, no. 2, 2016, p. 245; Marshall, Alex, “From Civil War to Proxy War: Past History 
and Current Dilemmas”, Small Wars & Insurgencies, vol. 27, no. 2, 2016, p. 183; Hughes, Geraint 
Alun, “Syria and the Perils of Proxy Warfare”, Small Wars & Insurgencies, vol. 25, no. 3, 2014, p. 
527. 
11 Asseburg & Wimmen, op. cit., p. 1. 
12 Charap, Samuel, “Russia, Syria and the Doctrine of Intervention”, Survival, vol. 55, no. 1, 2013, 
p. 35. 
13 Interview with Isabelle Facon, Senior Research Fellow at the Fondation pour la Recherche 
stratégique (FRS), by phone, 7 April 2017. 
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Russian Middle East foreign policy” ever since the implosion of the Soviet Union. 14 Thus, 
the Russian engagement is more than a simple reaction to the terrorist threat and 
Western interferences: since the Cold War period, Syria has allowed Russia to unlock 
its own geographical isolation from the ‘South’, to strategically expand its ‘defence 
perimeter’and to project its influence in the region and beyond. 15  The military 
intervention in Syria combined with an extensive diplomatic ‘offensive’ has served as 
a catalyst for Russia’s reassertion in the great power game. 16 Blocking a transatlantic-
led military operation in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) helped implement 
Russia’s “multipolar foreign policy” 17  and made the Euro-Atlantic community 
dependent on Moscow to solve the crisis.  
Adopting a structural realist approach, this paper analyses to what extent 
Russia’s reassertion through this conflict impacts the Euro-Atlantic relations and 
approaches to Syria and the Middle East. It argues that in the regional power vacuum 
created by the Arab Spring, Russia’s engagement has highlighted the limits of US and 
EU approaches to the region and their failure as security actors. Moreover, Russia’s 
reassertion as a regional hegemon in the Middle East challenges the Euro-Atlantic 
cohesion, and is likely to lead to a ‘forced emancipation’ of the EU from the US as a 
strategic foreign policy actor.  
Following the introduction of the concept of regional hegemony to explain 
Russia’s reassertion, this paper first addresses the dynamics and shortfalls of Euro-
Atlantic approaches to Syria. It then discusses to what extent Euro-Atlantic relations 
are questioned by Russia’s new assertiveness. Finally, the conclusion gathers the 
lessons drawn from this analysis. 
 
The search for regional hegemony: explaining Russia’s reassertion 
The Syrian crisis was given a unique shape because of its internationalisation and the 
divergences between external actors. In spite of the length of the conflict and the 
rapid deterioration of the humanitarian situation, the international community has not 
intervened, unlike in Libya. Despite the realists’ “skepticism regarding the relevance of 
                                                 
14  Varol Sevim, Tuğçe& Merve Suna Özel, “Rethinking Russian Mission to Syria”, European 
Scientific Journal, vol. 9, no. 19, July 2013, p. 445. 
15 See Delanoë, Igor, « Le retour de la Russie en Méditerranée », Cahiers de la Méditerranée, 
no. 89, 2014, uploaded 1 June 2015, retrieved 30 September 2016, p. 3, http://cdlm. 
revues.org/7652 
16 Didier, op. cit. 
17 Varol Sevim & Özel, op. cit., p. 448. 
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ethical norms to relations among states”,18 the theory remains useful to analyse the 
proxy war in Syria and its implications for the external powers involved.  
According to Morgenthau, the will for power is a fundamental element of all 
social relations. Thus, international politics is “a struggle for power”,19 a search for 
power either to shape or preserve the balance of power, which explains – at least 
partly – the temperance of states when engaging on the international stage.20 Going 
a step further, Waltz‘s neo-realism defines a bipolar system as the optimum balance of 
power in world politics.21 By contrast, Gilpin argues that international stability depends 
on the existence of a superpower becoming a hegemon, in comparison to which all 
other powers will situate themselves.22  
Finally, Mearsheimer, in a structural realist perspective, establishes that “it is the 
structure or the architecture of the international system that forces states to pursue 
power”. 23  In such an environment, states look for more power as it is a “key for 
survival”. 24  Mearsheimer follows Gilpin in acknowledging that states look for 
domination over others, but taking into account the geopolitical dimension of power 
and the difficulty for a state to project itself globally, great powers ultimately seek 
‘regional hegemony’ over the system within which they operate.25 A great power is 
then expected to be guided by the priority of ensuring the stability and sustainability 
of this system and its sustainability. These dynamics can lead a ‘regional hegemon’26 
to become a ‘predator’27 when faced with a decrease of its power. When challenged 
by competing powers, a regional hegemon may become a ‘system challenger’28 or 
                                                 
18 “Political Realism in International Relations”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 26 July 
2010, edited 2 April 2013, retrieved 11 October 2016, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/realism-
intl-relations  
19 Morgenthau, Hans J., Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, Boston, 
McGraw-Hill Higher Education, 2006, 7th edition. 
20 Battistella, Dario, Théorie des relations internationales, Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, 2009, 3rd 
edition, p. 130. 
21 Waltz, Kenneth, Theory of International Politics, Boston, McGraw-Hill, 1979. 
22 Gilpin, Robert, War and Change in World Politics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1981.  
23 Mearsheimer, John J., “Structural Realism”, in Dunne, Tim, Milja Kurki & Steve Smith (eds.), 
International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010, 
2nd edition, p. 78. 
24 Mearsheimer, John J., The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, New York, WW Norton, 2001, p. 
21. 
25 Mearsheimer, “Structural Realism”, op. cit., p. 89. 
26 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, op. cit., p. 41. 
27 Battistella, op. cit., p. 157. 
28 Destradi, Sandra, “Regional Powers and their Strategies: Empire, Hegemony, Leadership”, 
Review of International Studies, vol. 36, no. 4, 2010, pp. 903-930. 
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‘revisionist power’. 29  In this context, the structural realist approach of ‘regional 
hegemony’ can be combined with the concept of multipolarity or ‘polyarchy’. 30 
Nevertheless, Battistella distinguishes between ‘hegemony’ and ‘empire’ insofar as the 
hegemon’s leadership is conducted with the consent of the other states that 
recognise the hegemon as such.31 Hence, whereas Russia has behaved as an empire 
regarding Ukraine, it has acted as a hegemon in Syria. 
Thus, Russia’s search for regional hegemony has implications for other external 
actors’ approaches to the region. Furthermore, in the case of the Euro-Atlantic 
community, Simoni argues that “the fundamental premise behind neorealist 
explanations for the future of transatlantic relations, in particular their cooperative 
efforts, lies behind the perception of, and reaction to, a commonly perceived 
threat”.32 Hence, the structural realists’ regional hegemony approach is a relevant 
framework, not only to study external power dynamics at work in the Syrian conflict, 
but also to study the impact it has on the transatlantic relations per se. The two 
following sections respectively address these two dimensions. 
 
Dynamics and shortfalls of transatlantic approaches to the Syrian crisis 
The Syrian crisis is a symptom of the Euro-Atlantic community’s incapacity to stabilise 
and secure the Middle East. As a matter of fact, the transatlantic reactions to 
Damascus’ use of violence against civilians did not stop the crisis from escalating and 
contrasted with Russia’s forceful support of Assad. In the context of the US ‘pivot’ to 
Asia, Obama’s ‘reset’ policy and security considerations regarding the terrorist threat, 
this relatively measured response has enshrined Russia’s role as a regional hegemon in 
the Middle East. 33  Transatlantic attitudes vis-à-vis Russia have been equivocal, 
condemning Russia’s manoeuvres against ‘moderate’ rebels, while at the same time 
stressing the “importance to cooperate with Russia”.34 This attitude has facilitated 
Russia’s reassertion as a regional hegemon.  
                                                 
29 Melvin, Neil, “Russia: Europe’s Revisionist Power”, in Grevi, Giovanni & Daniel Keohane (eds.), 
Challenges for European Foreign Policy in 2015: How Others Deal with Disorder, Madrid, FRIDE, 
2015, pp. 31-38. 
30 Brown, op. cit., p. 245. 
31 Battistella, op. cit., p. 269. 
32  Simoni, Serena, Understanding Transatlantic Relations: Whither the West?, London, 
Routledge, 2013, p. 23. 
33 Delanoë, Igor, « Etats-Unis et Russie : les balbutiements de la ‘Guerre froide’ », Confluences 
Méditerranéennes, vol. 2, no. 89, 2014, pp. 133-143. 
34 Interview with Ambassador Anthony Gardner, former Ambassador of the United States to the 
European Union, Bruges, 27 March 2017. 
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Transatlantic approach(es) to the Arab Spring: dashed hopes for a united response, 
open door for Russia’s regional reassertion  
The Arab Spring reshaped the political landscape and geopolitical chessboard of the 
Middle East and North Africa. The EU, its member states and the US had major 
difficulties reaching a consensus on a joint response, apart from calling for political 
transition in these countries. Such vacillation finds its explanation in the discrepancies 
existing in the Euro-Atlantic approaches to security.  
Emphasising the ‘societal’ dimension of security,35 the EU and its member states 
mainly feared massive migration flows,36 and took time before condemning authori-
tarian regimes and leaders. Regarding Syria, the EU focused on addressing the refugee 
crisis and the terrorist threat, as well as on “stabilisation efforts” in neighbouring 
countries to prevent destabilisation to spread.37 On the contrary, the US analysed the 
Arab Spring through the “political/military security” prism of the potential regional 
instability that could have resulted in bringing Islamist parties to power.38 Hence, the 
transatlantic partners’ responses were not defined vis-à-vis each other, but in reaction 
to major disruptions in the order of the Middle East, bringing to light the absence of a 
common perception of threats and opportunities.  
Such a transatlantic deadlock left plenty of room for Russia’s manoeuvre, 
whose approach to the Middle East is an integral part of its ‘Grand Strategy’ – Russia’s 
comprehensive effort to shape the world order to its liking through a combination of 
all ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power instruments at its disposal.39 Although the post-Soviet space 
remains Moscow’s top foreign policy priority, Russia has reaped the fruits of its 
inflexibility in Syria – regarding the fate of Assad and the refusal to distinguish between 
‘moderate’ rebels and terrorist groups – and asserted itself as an equal player to the 
US in managing the crisis. This became for the first time visible on the occasion of the 
agreement on the neutralisation of Syria’s chemical weapons stocks. 40  Moscow’s 
obstinacy proves that it has learnt its lessons from the West’s interventions in the 
                                                 
35 Keukeleire, Stephan & Tom Delreux, The Foreign Policy of the European Union, Basingstoke, 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2014, 2nd edition, p. 31. 
36 Simoni, op. cit., p. 96. 
37 Barnes-Dacey, James, “The War Next Door: Syria and the Erosion of Stability in Lebanon, 
Jordan and Turkey”, ECFR Policy Brief, no. 182, London, July 2016, p. 1. 
38 Simoni, op. cit., p. 96. 
39 See Stepanova, Ekaterina, “Russia in the Middle East: Back to a ‘Grand Strategy’ of Enforcing 
Multilateralism?”, Politique étrangère, été, no. 2, 2016, pp. 23-35. 
40  U.S. Department of State, Framework for Elimination of Syrian Chemical Weapons, 14 




Balkans, Iraq and Libya: implementing a ‘de-ideologised’ strategy, 41  it seeks to 
counteract the West’s “business of regime change” 42  and instead promotes a 
multipolar balance of power. This helps to understand why in Syria Moscow confronts 
Washington while ignoring European states as power players.  
Although such a strategy has allowed Moscow to appear as a credible actor, 
the rebalancing of power in the region is still partly explained by transatlantic 
shortcomings. Considering the Syrian conflict as a ‘zero-sum game’, Russia has taken 
advantage of the Euro-Atlantic community, which underestimated the scope of 
Moscow’s interests. 
Russia’s dual approach in confronting the Euro-Atlantic community in Syria 
Friedman argues that Russia’s diplomatic and military engagement was expected to 
fulfil two main objectives: “to demonstrate that – whatever the diplomacy – Russia was 
a military power to be taken seriously” and “to put the US in a position where publicly 
[…] Russians would be viewed as a partner and not a hostile force”.43 
Because of the EU’s ambitious development of the European Neighbourhood 
Policy as of 2004 and its Eastern and Southern regional dimensions, Russia started to 
perceive the EU as a menace to its influence in its own near abroad. With the 2009 
Lisbon Treaty the EU clearly sought to export its values on a global level, which 
appeared to Moscow as intrusive. Under President Putin, Russia progressively “re-
embraced notions of ‘Eurasianism’ and defined its geopolitical identity in opposition 
to the EU’s proclaimed doctrine of ‘soft power’”. 44  Driven by its own domestic 
challenges and political dynamics, Russia started to identify the EU through the realist 
prism of survival. This led Russia to seek to scupper the influence of the EU in the Middle 
East through the Syrian conflict. Moscow’s determination was encouraged by the 
timidity or inadequacy of European approaches: neither the EU nor its member states 
were prepared for the outbreak of such a conflict in Syria. The undermining of Europe’s 
                                                 
41 Delanoë, « Etats-Unis et Russie : les balbutiements de la ‘Guerre froide’ », op. cit., p. 138. 
42 Russian Foreign Minister S. Lavrov’s statement to Russia Today, 21 December 2012, quoted in 
“Russia ‘not in business’ to persuade Syrian president to quit: Lavrov”, Al Arabiya News, 21 
December 2012, retrieved 24 April 2017, https://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/12/21/ 
256365.html  
43 Friedman, George, “Why Putin went into Syria”, Geopolitical Futures, 15 March 2016, retrieved 
25 April 2017, https://geopoliticalfutures.com/why-putin-went-into-syria  
44 Eskelinen, Heikki, Ilkka Liikanen & James Wesley Scott, “On the Edge of Neighbourhood: 
Regional Dimensions of the EU-Russia Interface”, in Eskelinen, Heikki, Ilkka Liikanen & James 
Wesley Scott (eds.), The EU-Russia Borderland: New Contexts for Regional Cooperation, 
London, Routledge, 2012, p. 1. 
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role in the war by Russia thus relies on Europe’s hesitancies, due to the EU institutions’ 
lack of competences and the members’ lack of political will and/or common ground. 
This made the EU a mere spectator of a crisis which generated serious implications in 
terms of refugee flows and internal cohesion. 
When it comes to the US, Moscow tends to react and implement a strategy to 
counter the American political and military hegemony in the Middle East. In a context 
of US withdrawal and ‘rhetorical reset’, 45  the magnitude of the revolutionary 
earthquake in the Arab world obliged Washington to again focus on it. The US had 
suffered a significant loss of influence due to the absence of a consistent approach 
comparable to Russia’s Grand Strategy. Despite proof for the use of chemical 
weapons in Syria in 2013, the US was – contrary to its invasion of Iraq a decade earlier 
– unwilling to engage militarily. Obama was reluctant to find the US again at the centre 
of a political turmoil and thus unwilling to start a new military engagement. He was 
afraid of losing face when confronted with crossings of ‘red lines’ set by him or of being 
accused of further deteriorating the situation like after the West’s intervention in Libya. 
Hence, Moscow offered Washington the opportunity of a small diplomatic victory 
through the elimination of the Syrian chemical arsenal.46  
Confronted with Russia, the Euro-Atlantic partners lacked leverage to influence 
the course of events, to bargain with regional actors such as Tehran, or to pressure 
Damascus. Yet above all, they lacked a concrete and coherent strategy. This was 
illustrated by the choice of diplomatic means such as repeated cease-fire agreements 
negotiated by the US, Russia and the members of the International Syria Support 
Group, and signed by the Assad regime and opposition groups. These cease-fire 
agreements have been repeatedly broken by both the regime and Moscow, and 
mainly favoured the Assad forces, which each time gained ground over the rebels, 
without substantially weakening ISIS. Thus, more than its own assets, Russia built its Syrian 
strategy on transatlantic deficiencies in finding an appropriate answer to the conflict. 
Such an analysis can, at least partly, explain why a reinforcement of the transatlantic 
cohesion was preferred over a more confrontational attitude. The dynamics of this 
reinforcement, however, proved to be mainly steered by the US. 
                                                 
45  Gerges, Fawaz A., “The Obama Approach to the Middle East: The End of America’s 
Moment?”, International Affairs, vol. 89, no. 2, 2013, p. 302. 




Transatlantic prospects for a American- or European-steered military intervention 
Washington’s Middle East policy in the last decades was characterised by its 
omnipresence in the region and by the ‘Eisenhower Doctrine’ which promised military 
or economic aid to any Middle Eastern country needing help in resisting communist 
(in particular Soviet) aggression.47 Paradoxically, however, the Syrian crisis showcased 
a hegemonic ‘vacuum’ in the region. The origins of this vacuum can be found in the 
global rebalancing of US leadership after the neo-conservative policy of President 
Bush jr. This foreign policy shift goes along with a realist turn, according to which the 
great power, be it hegemonic or not, has to cooperate and co-build responses to the 
issue at stake rather than expecting others to bandwagon on a unilateral initiative. This 
explains why, with regard to Syria, Washington first chose to build on the UNSC 
framework and co-lead with European partners while maintaining a dialogue with 
Russia, in order to prevent an ‘imperial overstretch’. 48  In a cautious multipolar 
perspective, which Russia’s reassertion aimed to promote,49 the UNSC was still the 
primary international discussion arena, where the US enjoys leverage. Through military 
interventionist intimidation, Washington convinced Moscow to move towards a more 
compromising approach. 
On the transatlantic level, despite the reluctance towards a military intervention 
on both sides, the Syrian crisis highlights an exchange of roles in terms of initiative, 
hence a reversal of power relations, between the US and Europe. In Syria, Obama did 
not want to act unilaterally. France, a leading country in denouncing the US 
unilateralism in 2003, this time took the lead in proposing military action against the 
Syrian regime. 50  This attempt at seizing a steering role culminated in the French 
proposal of a UNSC resolution under Chapter VII, which was to a certain degree 
supported by Germany. Despite Moscow’s warnings, France and Germany stepped 
up to face Russia, whereas Central and Eastern European member states of the EU 
hesitated to take action in Syria. In the end, this European indecision was taken short 
by the rejection of a military intervention by the Parliament of the United Kingdom.  
                                                 
47 Eisenhower, Dwight D., former President of the United States, “The US Role in the Middle East”, 
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Yet, despite individual leadership attempts, these member states remained 
mainly preoccupied with their relationship with Washington. Surely, the EU was a 
leading force when it came to imposing sanctions on the Assad regime,51 and it 
played an important part in backing the mediation efforts of the UN Secretary General 
Special Envoy. Nevertheless, the EU’s humanitarian means have prevailed over 
coercive ones, which would have been hardly plausible without a sizable American 
involvement. Thus, the Syrian conflict is partly a missed opportunity for the EU to make 
a ‘qualitative leap’ in its military cooperation. 52 The cause of such impediments to a 
common, coherent and forceful transatlantic response was not Russia and its rise in 
blocking negotiations but diverging positions between EU member states. Here, once 
again, European foreign policy turned out to be a heterogeneous set of national 
foreign policies whose priorities may take precedence over the Union’s interest. 
Between a Europeanised US Middle East policy and a supportive EU approach 
US foreign policy in the 2010s seems to have rebutted Kagan’s pre-Iraq presumption 
that “Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus”,53 insofar as the US 
proved to be more reluctant than Europe54 to engage in Syria. The United States’ less 
unilateral and aggressive foreign policy could be interpreted as a more ‘Euro-
peanised’ approach. Despite this rapprochement, the US continued to “assume the 
role of the only veto power in the conduct of Arab regional politics”, and to “structure 
the behavior of all competing powers”,55 including the EU.  
The EU approach to the Middle East has evolved towards more comprehensive-
ness, as can be seen through the three Communications published between 2013 and 
2017. 56  However, the effectiveness of such a comprehensive approach was 
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hampered by the Syrian crisis. Indeed, as predicted by Faria: “[a]s a result of political 
and ‘organisational’ realism, and given the EU’s capacity constraints, it is likely that the 
focus and efforts towards a ‘comprehensive approach’ will be hijacked by crisis and 
conflict situations, because member states’ attention and prioritisation tends to focus 
on such situations”.57 This explains why the EU has progressively shifted from focusing 
on the regional level to addressing Syria itself, thus acknowledging that political 
problems in the neighbourhood are different. In a context of transatlantic 
interdependence, this downward adjustment of European ambitions highlights the 
fact that Europe remains mainly supportive. The EU is indeed rather constrained both 
by its institutions’ competencies and by limited capacities, as visible through the 
‘Council decision on an EU strategy for Syria’. 58  Even if the EU can build on its 
importance as the major humanitarian aid provider and post-crisis reconstruction 
actor, or on new constructive dialogues such as the one with Tehran since the nuclear 
deal, it has not yet proven to be an equal interlocutor to Russia.59 
Back to realism: transatlantic strategic reconfigurations 
The US’ progressive ‘comeback’ strategy in the Middle East since 2015 – forced rather 
than chosen – was designed through a realist foreign policy shift to avoid being 
overwhelmed by an escalation. This shift was embodied by the ‘leading from behind’ 
strategy,60 promoted by  the US Department of Defense,61 and through the White 
House’s idea of “strategic patience and persistence”.62 However, the inability of the 
EU and its member states to deal with the crisis in Syria made them irrelevant. Instead, 
Obama followed Richelieu’s principle in the transatlantic relations: “what must be 
supported, and the force that must support it, must be geometrically proportional”.63 
Admittedly, the EU is not a ‘power player’ per se, but more of a power ‘payer’.64 In 
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dealing with the Syrian crisis, the main power player from the Euro-Atlantic community 
remains the US. However, confronted with long-term strategic threats, one could say 
that in sharing the burden, the EU and the US approaches converged. 
The 2016 EU Global Strategy (EUGS)65 aims to address the shortcomings of the 
pre-Lisbon EU Security Strategy. 66  The EUGS should allow the Union to achieve 
“considerable convergence”67 among member states and institutions in order to gain 
more credibility as a security actor. Through this strategic document the EU seeks to 
operate a geopolitical ‘recalibration’ of its foreign policy based on ‘principled 
pragmatism’.68 Thus, the EU has drawn realist lessons from its Arab Spring mistakes: it 
has shifted its approach away from issues dealing with democracy promotion towards 
security and an emphasis on ‘hard’ power.69  
The ongoing regional turmoil in Syria and Iraq represents a pivotal moment for 
the Union and a litmus test for the EUGS. The proxy war in Syria is a challenge not only 
for the transatlantic approach(es) to this region, but also for the relations between the 
Euro-Atlantic partners.  
The following section addresses discusses the necessities and opportunities for 
the Euro-Atlantic community to adapt. 
 
Transatlantic relations at a crossroads: the Syrian conflict as an incubator of a 
leadership transfer 
Russia’s hegemonic reassertion is for the transatlantic partners both a familiar and an 
uncharted challenge. Familiar, because it seems to follow the patterns of the Cold 
War, characterised by proxy dynamics and escalations. Uncharted, because contrary 
to the Cold War, the West today experiences difficulties in identifying the threat 
represented by Russia and in uniting. The confrontation with Russia in Syria poses both 
external and internal challenges to transatlantic relations and further questions their 
reconfiguration. The following subsection first addresses the external challenges.  
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The Russian threat at the height of a reciprocal defiance with the Euro-Atlantic 
community 
Syria is a ‘symptom’ 70 of a renewed confrontation between Russia and the Euro-
Atlantic community. Visible since the 2008 war in Georgia, it is one piece of a complex 
puzzle composed of long-standing, conflicting foreign policy priorities and opposing 
views regarding the use of force, which bodes a long-term trend to “continued conflict 
and confrontation”.71 In such a context, Syria has been the occasion for Moscow to 
prove that neutralising the US and Europe is feasible.  
With respect to Putin’s ‘revisionist power’ through Crimea and Syria, Charap 
and Shapiro argue that Obama followed the ‘middle way’, which is “based on a 
calculus that a new Cold War can be avoided without having to negotiate with Russia 
about the regional order”. 72 The failure of this ‘middle way’ was highlighted by the 
escalation following the shootdown of a Russian military aircraft by Turkey – a member 
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), and across the updates of Moscow’s 
main strategic documents. In Russia’s ‘Military Doctrine’ (December 2014), ‘Security 
Strategy’ (December 2015) and ‘Foreign Policy Concept’ (November 2016) “it is clear 
that ‘the West’ is the focus of Russia’s threat and risk assessment”.73 Nevertheless, 
Russia has actually to a certain extent responded to the transatlantic community’s 
own wariness, as acknowledged in the NATO 2010 Strategic Concept.74 Also, in a 
situation where Europe has been growingly entrapped by a “ring of fire”,75 Russia’s 
confrontation in Syria constitutes a risk multiplier. The Syrian conflict is thus relevant 
when it comes to discuss external risks for the transatlantic partners as it brings together 
a whole set of major common challenges: the Middle East turmoil, terrorism and its 
direct and indirect consequences, Russia and the changing world order. Combined, 
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these external threats tend to exacerbate already existing internal divides, which are 
set out in the next subsection. 
Europe marginalised, Europe divided: a two-level risk for transatlantic relations 
The Syrian crisis is not only marked by struggles for regional hegemony between Russia 
and the transatlantic partners, but it is also characterised by a certain isolation of 
Europe. Indeed, the conflict erupted at a time when both sides no longer view Euro-
Atlantic relations as crucial as they have historically been. Despite close security and 
defence cooperation in Afghanistan and Libya, the US conceives of the EU as a 
‘civilian’ foreign policy actor, and not as a security actor, with regard to military 
aspects.76 The US seems not to conceive of the EU as a reliable diplomatic actor either, 
which can explain the absence of the EU from key negotiations dealing with Syria.  
Moscow also draws benefits from the EU’s security architecture. The EU is indeed 
limited by the institutional setting of its security architecture, as well as by some large 
member states like France which ‘punched above its weight’ to show its ability to seize 
the initiative.77 This internal EU competition neutralised the influence of both individual 
member states and the Union as a whole. This distortion was even more important 
given that the crisis has had major consequences for Europe, which suffered from both 
the refugee crisis and an offensive Russian strategy of influence. 
Moscow took “a leading role in the Syrian civil war by supporting Syrian 
President Assad, which has driven migratory flow toward Europe”. 78  Russia thus 
contributed to a certain extent to the political divisions within the EU which it has since 
then been exploiting. Indeed, the terrorist threat and the refugee crisis combined have 
increased tensions within the EU, but also within NATO. NATO was brought in through 
the anti-smuggling mission in the Aegean Sea. However, such a mission “sits firmly 
within the realm of what the EU’s CSDP should be capable of”.79 Coincidentally, the 
fact that French President Hollande invoked Article 42.7 TEU rather than Article 5 of the 
North Atlantic Treaty to call for a security response after the terrorist attack in Paris in 
November 2015 can appear as paradoxical, if not contradictory. Yet, while it could 
be argued that this invocation aimed “to shame Europe into greater burden 
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sharing”,80 it can also be considered an impetus for further investment in a Europe as 
a security actor. And NATO’s anti-smuggling mission can be seen less as “a reaction 
to the humanitarian catastrophe at sea” than “a response to growing Russian 
assertiveness”.81 
In its search for regional hegemony in the Middle East, Moscow also operates 
revisionist tactics vis-à-vis the EU and its member states. Russia’s engagement in Syria 
appears as a quest for predation, since its “re-emergence as a world power has 
become the first priority of its political agenda”.82 Recalling Waltz’s neorealism,83 the 
perception of such a polar resurrection has the potential to revive the old Cold War 
paradigm and lead to a re-intensification of transatlantic relations. If “a strong and 
balanced approach to Russia”84 is considered necessary, the prerequisite is a ‘strong 
and balanced’ Euro-Atlantic relationship. For now, in the context of regional 
competition for hegemony, the transatlantic partners face the risk to divert from each 
other by being drawn into “the vortex of centrifugal systemic forces”. 85  Russia 
perceives the EU as a continuation of the US threat. From a structural realist point of 
view, Russia’s assertion on the world stage calls for an upswing in terms of rhetoric, 
resources and capacities on each side of the Atlantic. In other words, it calls for more 
strategic autonomy for the EU. 
Transatlantic relations transformed: towards a leadership swap? 
The Middle East turmoil is marked by the concomitance of two phenomena: 
reinforced intra-state and transnational ethno-sectarian tensions – not entirely 
independent of the rise of ISIS – and an evolving geopolitical configuration of states’ 
relations and competition at the regional level. In this context, hegemonic competitors 
(re)emerge as disruptive players. Such a disruption calls for a new approach of the 
strategically predominant actor – namely the US. It also calls for a reconfiguration of 
this actor’s relationship with its closest allies. 
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“During the Cold War, European governments offered solidarity to their 
superpower patron in exchange for security and a junior role in the partnership that 
ran the world. This arrangement gave them at least a sense of power, without much 
weight of responsibility.”86 Transatlantic relations were thus steered by a ‘transactional’ 
model of leadership which was ultimately based on the interests of the US.87 However, 
the end of the Cold War has transformed the transatlantic partnership in a more 
‘intrinsically dynamic’ relationship. 88  The US would benefit from implementing a 
‘transformational leadership’89 that increases transatlantic cohesiveness by empower-
ing the EU and taking into account its specificities. From such a point of view, the 
vacuum in the Middle East resulting from the US withdrawal does not only benefit 
Russia, it also leaves room for the EU.  
Transposing Snyder’s approach to alliance politics to EU-US relations, powers in 
an ‘asymmetrical alliance’ take the risk of becoming entrapped.90 Building on Simon’s 
affirmation that “the US ‘rebalance’ to Asia is in Europe’s interest”,91 the Syrian crisis 
appears as a ‘window of opportunity’ for the EU to take the lead in formulating a 
transatlantic response to the turmoil in its greater neighbourhood. This requires 
commitment from both the EU and its member states. Instead of simply ‘externalising’ 
the US’ Middle East burden, 92 the current upheavals call for a better ‘division of labour’ 
and for Europe to assume its responsibilities. In a ‘post-American world’,93 the time for 
a ‘post-American Europe’94 has come. 
The transatlantic approach to crises in the Middle East and North Africa region 
has worked for a long time on the basis of the US providing ‘hard’ power and the EU 
‘civilian’ and/or ‘normative’ power through its ‘structural foreign policy’. 95  This 
approach has proven to be inefficient when confronted with the Arab Spring. 
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Combining all the symptoms of both the post-Arab Spring socio-political turmoil and 
the regional power reconfiguration,96 the Syrian conflict has been shaped by the new 
US-Russian bipolar dynamics that seem to have sidestepped the EU, at the risk of 
playing a rather ‘accessory’97 part in regional crises.  
From a structural realist perspective, however, such a context can be analysed 
as a ‘lynchpin moment’ with a long-term impact for the EU as a foreign policy actor. 
Despite vacillations, the EU seems at least partially “to have given up its traditional 
reluctance in favour of a more assertive role in global politics, seeking co-equal 
leadership”98 with the US, or at least should do so. The Syrian crisis, combined with 
Russia’s reassertion, turned out to be an existential stake for the EU to formulate its 
strategic rhetoric.  
The EU Global Strategy: a strategic leap? 
Despite the progressive building of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), 
European strategic rhetoric has remained a prerogative of states, avoiding “any EU-
wide reconsideration of strategic needs and objectives”. 99  However, history has 
proven that the CFSP has at times been enhanced through successive crises; the war 
in Syria thus opens the possibility for a major leap forward. 
Wallace argues that the EUGS “called for the EU to accept that it must take 
responsibility for its own security […] to develop a more concerted external message 
to counter hostile narratives from elsewhere and to accept the need for closer 
defence cooperation”.100 In this regard, the Syrian conflict can be enlightening for two 
reasons. First, being marginalised, Europeans should draw lessons from the conflict and 
explore new formulas of action at the EU level rather than at the member states’ level. 
Second, developing a coherent, firm and workable strategy is indispensable for 
coping with predatory hegemons. With the EUGS initiating a new strategic rhetoric, 
the geopolitical reconfiguration at stake may then be an opportunity for a sui generis 
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EU foreign policy, which could allow the EU to assert itself as well as a regional 
hegemon, in the sense of Mearsheimer.  
 
Conclusion: towards ‘post-American’ transatlantic relations? 
Characterised by a new balance of power at the extra-regional level, the proxy war 
rationale in Syria echoes the Ukrainian conflict, perceived in the Middle East as its 
complex ‘continuation’.101 Through a realist approach, this paper has explored the 
implications of Russia’s reassertion for both the Euro-Atlantic approaches towards Syria 
and the Middle East and Euro-Atlantic relations themselves. It argues that in the 
regional power vacuum, Russia’s engagement has highlighted the failure of the US 
and the EU as security actors and of their policies towards the region. Furthermore, 
Russia’s reassertion as a regional hegemon represents a major challenge for Euro-
Atlantic cohesion, and is likely to lead to a ‘forced emancipation’ of the EU from the 
US as a strategic foreign policy actor. It must not be overestimated102 in the context of 
the region’s ‘systemic crisis’,103 that Russia’s reassertion is a symptom that the “rise of 
the rest” 104  proves to shape post-American world politics. And as long as the US 
depends on Russia’s cooperation on a certain number of international issues, tensions 
will keep rising in what appears to be, if not a new Cold War, a ‘Cold Peace’.105 
Showcasing new regional dynamics, marked by sectarian confrontations and 
unprecedented geopolitical tensions, the Syrian conflict is a key milestone for trans-
atlantic relations in a contested post-Cold War world order. Requiring a forceful 
response while avoiding any direct confrontation, the crisis exposes “vexing policy 
challenges”106 to the Euro-Atlantic community, both with regard to Russia but also for 
transatlantic relations per se. Russia’s reassertion has highlighted the shortcomings of 
the Euro-Atlantic community when confronted to such complex multi-dimensional 
foreign policy issues. The EU’s role has been considerably undermined, not only as a 
military actor, but also as a second-tier – if not absent – player in the rather 
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unsuccessful diplomatic peace process negotiations in Syria. Brussels was barely 
involved in the transatlantic process, substituted with a direct channel between 
Washington and Paris. 107 Until now, the EU has focused on ‘societal security’ and 
region-wide development initiatives while ignoring the geopolitical reality. By contrast, 
the US seemed to be blind to societal and sectarian conflictual patterns as well as 
Russia’s interests as a power player. The current turmoil proved this silo-based 
transatlantic approach to be sterile insofar as it ignored the regional dynamics and 
their transversal character.  
Yet, beyond these shortfalls, the current situation could also be an opportunity 
for a pragmatic reconfiguration allowing the Euro-Atlantic community to fill the ‘value 
gap’ 108  between American ‘exceptionalism’ and European ‘universalism’. The US 
withdrawal from the region is also an incentive for the EU to assert itself as a pragmatic 
security actor. The EU would have room for manoeuvre to build on its own assets in the 
Mediterranean. The American ‘unilateral moment’ in the Middle East is over, and the 
US no longer has the ability or the means to determine the region’s (geo)political 
agenda. Charap and Shapiro argue that during the second term of the Obama 
Administration a certain “Cold War nostalgia in Washington” was recalled as “a period 
of comforting predictability”.109 However, the world order is no longer the same and, 
most importantly, no longer predictable: an unstable foreign policy under the Trump 
presidency will undoubtedly have considerable resonance and impact on the Middle 
East’s geopolitical equilibrium. 
Obama’s early Middle East policy relied on three interlinked objectives: with-
drawing from Iraq, restoring America’s image to build confidence and ‘containing’ 
the foes while reinitiating dialogue – demonstrated by the Iran nuclear deal in 2015. 
By contrast, today Trump’s foreign policy remains vague and unclear: between ‘soft 
isolationism’110 and a return to confrontational unilateralism on the one hand and 
‘belligerent minimalism’ on the other.111 While decreasing the US’s involvement in the 
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Middle East and support to the Syrian rebels, Trump also wants to eradicate ISIS. If this 
approach will go on par with a renewed tolerance vis-à-vis authoritarian regimes, 
Bouchet predicts that Trump would also seek “unconditional rapprochement with 
Russia”,112 which would have considerable consequences for Euro-Atlantic relations. 
However, President Trump did not hesitate to bomb a Syrian military airport in response 
to a chemical attack in April 2017. This bombing was launched without concertation 
with the partners and was accompanied by a verbal condemnation of Tehran and 
Moscow.113 It thus seems that, although Euro-Atlantic relations may be experiencing a 
period of doubt, an US-Russia rapprochement might not be on the agenda. In the 
end, the currently determining factor of the US policy towards the Middle East is 
uncertainty. In an unstable geopolitical environment, this uncertainty can be 
expected to push for an assertion of European security and defence capabilities. 
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